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ADULT INCEST SURVIVORS AND THE STATIUTE OF
LIMITATIONS: THE DELAYED DISCOVERY RULE AND
LONG-TERM DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently, an incest1 victim can only initiate a personal injury
suit on or before her nineteenth birthday because the statute of limi-
tations has run one year after she attains majority. Current research,
however, indicates that injury to incest survivors is both long term
and slow to manifest itself.' This newly-aired information exposes
the harshness of the statute of limitations as applied to incest cases.
This comment argues that application of the delayed discovery ac-
crual exception to the statute of limitations is appropriate for dam-
ages suffered by adult incest survivors. The comment also explores
existing California statutory and equitable exceptions to the standard
application of the statute of limitations. Additionally, the reasoning
and policy underlying presently existing exceptions will be applied to
C 1985 by Denise M. DeRose
1. The best definition of incest for the purposes of this comment is that offered by S.
BUTLER, CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST (1978). She defines "incestuous
assault" as "any manual, oral or genital sexual contact or other explicit sexual behavior that
an adult family member imposes on a child who is unable to alter or understand the adult's
behavior because of his or her powerlessness in the family and early stage of psychological
development." Id. at 405. Butler does not limit the definition to sexual intercourse, but ex-
pands it to include "any sexual activity or experience imposed on a child which results in
emotional, physical or sexual trauma." Id. at 5.
A more complex definition is offered by J. RENVOIZE, INCEST: A FAMILY PATTERN
(1982):
[Flor our purposes, incest is a sexual relationship that may continue for years or
be expressed overtly by nothing more than a single act, that takes place between
a young person under the age of consent and an older person who has a close
family tie which is either a blood tie . . . or is a substitute for such relationships
as with step-parent or parents' lover where the substitute has effectively taken
over the role of the missing parent. The sexual acts can vary from exhibitionism
to full intercourse: the only essential is that they shall be perceived eithei con-
temporaneously or later by the younger person to be of a sexual nature and of
sufficient intensity to cause disturbance in that younger person.
Id. at 31.
This comment utilizes the much broader definition of incest given by Butler and Renvo-
ize, and not the one that is established in the CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (Dering 1983):
"Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by
law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or
adultery with each other" are guilty of incest under the Cal. Penal Code.
2. See infra notes 3-25 and accompanying text.
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the situation of adult incest survivors.
II. THE DAMAGED SURVIVORS OF INCEST
The term "incest victim" conjures up images of female children
ranging in age from infancy to adolescence' on the witness stand.'
Usually, however, one does not think of a twenty-five-year-old office
worker,5 or a forty-year-old mother of six children.' But these per-
sons, and hundreds of thousands of other adult women who have
survived an incestuous past, are all the victims of incest."
In an estimated seventy-five to ninety percent of all incestuous
relationships, the incest victim reaches her adult years never having
revealed her secret." Recent scientific literature reveals a predictable
3. In 80% of cases, incestuous conduct begins before the daughters reach the age of 13,
the average age being nine. J. L. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 83 (1981). Incest
also involves male children. However, because the great majority of victims are female, and
because the majority of offenders are male, this comment will refer to victims by using femi-
nine pronouns and to offenders by using masculine pronouns. See id. at 18-19.
4. A Solano County California Judge received national attention when he held a 12-
year-old girl in solitary confinement for eight days when she refused to supply the testimony
needed to convict her stepfather of child molestation charges to which he had previously con-
fesed. Defiance: Solitary for a Twelve Year Old, TIME, Jan. 23, 1984, at 35.
5. Herman describes an adult incest survivor:
A twenty-five year old office worker was seen in the emergency room with an
acute anxiety attack . . . The previous day she had been cornered in the office
by her boss who aggressively propositioned her . . . . It later emerged in psy-
chotherapy that this episode of sexual harassment had reawakened previously
repressed memories of sexual assaults by her father.
Id. at 8.
6. Herman describes an adult incest survivor as follows:
A forty-year old mother of six children was admitted to the hospital after in-
gesting an overdose of sleeping pills. Suicide appeared to her to be the only
means of escape from a twenty year marriage to a brutally abusive husband. In
psychotherapy she confided that as a child she had been repeatedly molested by
her stepfather. Her husband was the only person who knew her secret. She
found it impossible to leave her husband because she feared that he would ex-
pose her incest history. He had often threatened to use the incest history to
prove her an unfit mother and obtain custody of the children should she attempt
to divorce him.
Id. at 7-8.
7. Figures are widely divergent in estimating the numbers of women subjected to incest.
One researcher stated that 5-15% of the population is involved in incest. J. WOODBURY & E.
SCHWARTZ, THE SILENT SIN: A CASE HISTORY OF INCEST vi (1971). Another researcher
estimated that approximately 1,000,000 American women have been involved with incestuous
relations, and that some 16,000 new cases occur each year. D. FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VIC-
TIMIZED CHILDREN 88 (1979); see J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 42-50.
8. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 51 (1982).
Much writing has documented the unique familial and social situations which accompany
incest and enforce upon it a "conspiracy of silence." Incestuous fathers almost uniformly de-
mand secrecy from their daughters, threatening dire consequences for disclosure. S. BUTLER,
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and repetitious panoply of emotional, psychological and sometimes
physical manifestations of the damage suffered by adult incest survi-
vors years after the incestuous behavior has ceased.'
Survivors of incest, having learned to be victims of sexual abuse
in their youth, grow up expecting, and indeed receiving further
abuse in many aspects of their later lives.1 Incest survivors show a
marked tendency toward self-abuse. Accordingly, substance abuse
and addiction, alcohol abuse" and obesity 2 are found in higher inci-
dence among incest victims.
Not surprisingly, incest survivors demonstrate a pattern of vic-
timization in their adult lives." The fact that as many as eighty per-
cent of women molested as children have been institutionalized or
have engaged in prostitution' 4 illustrates this pattern. From their in-
cestuous experience, incest victims develop the belief that their self-
worth is derived solely from their sexuality." Thus, incest survivors
tolerate extreme abuse in their marriages, often wedding men who
will further mistreat and misuse them." The fact that nearly forty
percent of adult incest victims have attempted suicide 7 is further
supra note 1, at 32-33; J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 88.
When mothers are suspicious of or confronted by reports of incest, they often ignore them,
or accuse their daughters of lying because they are afraid themselves of the consequences and
implications of the revelation. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 40, 117. Daughters are often the
victims of their father's advances through the conscious or unconscious collusion of their
mothers. Thus, a daughter risks her mother's abandonment as well as her father's threats if
the incest is disclosed. S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 113-14.
If a daughter attempts to disclose the incest to an outsider, or even a professional, she is
likewise often disbelieved or rebuffed. S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 37-38. Society's great aver-
sion to the reality of incest prevents outsiders from "hearing" disclosures front victims, thus
creating a further barrier to prevent revelation of the familial secret. Comment, 'Tort Remedies
for Incestuous Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE 609, 616 (1983). Further, daughters aire often aware
that if the incest is disclosed, it will be seen by many as their fault. J. L. HERMAN, supra note
3, at 36-39. Therefore, it is not suprising that so few cases of incest are disclosed by daughters
while the daughters live at home.
9. See generally K. MEISELMAN, INCEST (1978).
10. Summit & Kryso, Sexual Abuse of Children: A Clinical Spectrum, 48 AM. J. OF
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 237-51 (1978).
11. A New York study revealed that 44 % of female drug users had expc.rienced incest
as children. Other studies revealed figures as high as 70 %. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 160;
HERMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
12. S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 21.
13. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 29.
14. Gagner, Female Child Victims of Sex Offense, 13 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 176, 176-92
(1965); RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 157-60; B. JUSTICE & R. JUSTICE, THE BROKEN TABOO:
SEX IN THE FAMILY 187-88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE].
15. S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 40.
16. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 101.
17. Id. at 99.
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proof of the victims' emotional imbalance.
Adults molested as children have severely impaired relationship
skills. 8 Incest survivors view other women as they see themselves, as
mere sex objects. 9 As a result, they often hold other women in con-
tempt. At the same time, women molested as children often remain
distant from men, expecting that the pattern of exploitation which
characterized their childhood will recur in their adult relationships."0
This emotional isolation is compounded by the victims' perception
that they are different from other people."' Studies reveal that fifty-
five percent of incest victims also suffer from some form of sexual
dysfunction. 2
The damage caused by incest is generational. Abused children
tend to become, or to marry, abusive people. They become parents
with a strong likelihood of abusing their own children, and often,
consciously or unconsciously permitting others to do so. Therefore,
the effects of incest do not end with the incest itself, but can recur as
a learned behavior in future generations."
The group portrait of adult incest survivors is a painful one.
They are a damaged people, with the greatest damage springing
from the violation of their trust in the love of a father or stepfather.' "
To summarize the question of harm: the preponderance of evi-
dence suggests that for any child, sexual contact with an adult,
especially a trusted relative, is a significant trauma which may
have long lasting deleterious effects . . . . [S]exual abuse does
increase the risk that the victims will experience a variety of
difficulties in later life . . . . Women who have been initiated
into sex prematurely by an act of exploitation appear particu-
larly vulnerable. . . . They have more than their share of dif-
ficulty developing a positive, self respecting sexual identity and
a rewarding sexual life."5
18. JUSTICE, supra note 14 at 186-87.
19. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 155. Conversely, other researchers have shown that
over one-third of incest victims developed a lesbian identity and orientation. K. MEISELMAN,
supra note 9, at 245-61; see K. BRADY, FATHER'S DAYS (1979).
20. JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 184-85; J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 155.
21. JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 183-84.
22. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 105; J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 155; JUSTICE,
supra note 1, at 184-87.
23. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 90.
24. Id. at 5.
25. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 33-34.
The factual experience of incestual damage has increasingly been documented by the sur-
vivors themselves: M. ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS, (1970); S. BUTLER,
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE: THE TRAUMA OF INCEST (1978); L. ARMSTRONG, Kiss DADDY
[Vol. 25
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In the past, courts were forced to rely solely on the testimony of the
plaintiff in evaluating subjectively manifested injuries such as emo-
tional distress. Out of mistrust for what could amount to self-serving
testimony, courts have relied historically on artificial and arbitrary
classifications when awarding damages for subjective injuries like
those suffered by adult incest survivors. 6 With the rise of modern
psychology, the basis for this judicial caution has been largely re-
moved. 17 The expansion of scientific research and literature regard-
ing the very real damages sustained by adult survivors of incest
should likewise remove the court's caution in allowing these claims
to go forward.
III. ADULT INCEST SURVIVORS AND THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
Incest victims have utilized various tort theories with moderate
success in seeking remedies. 8 However, the statute of limitations re-
mains the primary stumbling block for adult survivors of incest. The
general rule governing the commencement of civil actions is section
312 of the California Civil Procedure Code: "Civil actions, without
exception can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in
this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued, unless where,
in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute."2
The applicable California statutes which govern the remedies
sought by incest survivors are section 340, subsection 3,80 and section
GOODNIGHT: A SPEAK OUT ON INCEST (1978); S. FORWARD & C. BUCK, BETRAYAL OF
INNOCENCE: INCEST & ITS DEVASTATION (1978); K. BRADY, FATHER'S DAYS (1979); C.
VALE ALLEN, DADDY'S GIRL: A MEMOIR (1980).
26. See Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249 P.2d 843, 844-45
(1952). In this early California case, no recovery for emotional distress arising out of negligent
conduct was allowed unless the plaintiff also manifested physical harm.
27. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hospitals, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1980).
Molien removed the requirement that physical injury accompany neglige:,atly-inflicted
emotional distress. The court stated, " 'With the rise of modern psychology, the basis of this
caution . . . was removed.' " [citation omitted]. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
839.
28. Curry, How Incest Victims are Making Their Fathers Pay, San Francisco Chroni-
cle, June 3, 1982, at 45, col. 1; see also Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse 13
GOLDEN GATE, 609, 617-28 (1983) (assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress and negligent infliction of emotional distress are discussed as approprite forms to be uti-
lized in causes of action for incest damages). Invasion of privacy was utilized in Newlander v.
Newlander, Civ. No. C 319 815 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., originally fild April 16,
1980).
29. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 312 (Deering 1972).
30. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE 340 (3) (Deering 1972) reads in pertinent part:
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352(a). 1 When read jointly, these sections mandate that a victim
who has sustained incest-related injuries during her minority must
bring suit one year from the point at which the cause of action ac-
crues. The basic rule governing accrual of the statutory period of
limitations states that accrual occurs on the date of injury." Because
the statutory period begins at the age of majority, any suits brought
by an incest survivor for incest experiences occurring during the vic-
tim's minority years would be barred at the time of the victim's nine-
teenth birthday. Strict application of date-of-injury accrual, however,
proves highly inequitable for many reasons. The family and society
can enforce a "conspiracy of silence" upon incest victims.3 More-
over, most of the incest-related damages remain latent until the sur-
vivor's adult life.3 4 Furthermore, even when the incest damage be-
comes apparent, the causal connection between the childhood incest
and present psychological damage often remains unknown to the
victim.
In many contexts, date-of-injury accrual leads to harsh results. 5
Because of this, the California courts have long sought ways to avoid
manifest injustice and to achieve more equitable judgments. Courts
have utilized date-of-discovery accrual, also called the delayed dis-
covery rule, as a means to avoid injustice.3 The delayed discovery
[The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions other than for the
recovery of real property, are as follows]:
Within one year:
(3) An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, seduction of a person below the
legal age of consent, or for injury to one caused by the wrongful act . . . of
another ....
Id.
31. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352(a) (Deering 1972) reads in pertinent part:
(a) If a person entitled to bring an action . . . be, at the time the cause of action
accrued . . . [ulnder of age of majority; . . . the time of such disability is not a
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
Id.
32. See Laltin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 320-21 (1892); Lambert v. McKenzie, 135 Cal.
100, 103, 67, P. 6, 7 (1901); Developments in the Law - Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 1177 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Note]; Comment, Accrual of Statutes of Limitations:
California's Discovery Exceptions Swallow the Rule, 108 CALIF. L. REv. 106, 106-07 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Exceptions Swallow the Rule].
33. See supra note 8.
34. J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1.
35. See, e.g., Priola v. Paulino, 72 Cal. App. 3d 380, 140 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1st Dist.
1977); Calabresi v. County of Monterey 251 Cal. App. 2d 131, 59 Cal. Rptr. 224 (1st Dist.
1967); Kimball v. Pacific Gas & Elect. Co., 220 Cal. 203, 30 P.2d 39 (1934); Lambert v.
McKenzie, 135 Cal. 100, 103, 67 P. 6, 7 (1901).
36. See Firth v. Richter, 49 Cal. App. 545, 196 P. 277 (2nd Dist. 1920). The first
exception to the date-of-injury rule appeared in the indirect form of the doctrine of prospective
warranty. The plaintiff sued for violation of the warranty when trees he had bought as
[Vol. 25
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rule provides that the statute of limitations does not begin to run at
the time of injury, but may be tolled until such time as the plaintiff
knows, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should know,
of her injury and its cause. 7 With respect to adult survivors of in-
cest, application of the delayed discovery rule would mean that the
one year statutory period would run from the date at which the court
determined the survivor discovered or should have discovered the
harm caused her by the incest. 8
The remaining sections of this comment explore areas of Cali-
fornia law which currently utilize delayed discovery accrual. The ar-
ticle explores the causes of action available for fraud, constructive
fraud, and breach of fiduiciary duty as potential vehicles of relief for
incest victims. The comment also argues that because the circum-
stances of incest are similar to those under which delayed discovery
accrual has already been granted, a new discovery exception should
be created for incest survivors. The comment shows that. applying
the delayed discovery rule to incest cases does not offend the histori-
cal or policy reasons behind the statute of limitations. Finally, the
comment offers a set of equitable balancing factors from 'California
case law to use to determine when the statutory period should be
extended.
IV. CIRCUMVENTING THE BARRIER: CALIFORNIA APPROACHES
A. The Fraud Exception
The 1872 exception for actions on the grounds of fraud 9 is
California's oldest statutory exception to date-of-injury accrual. The
California Legislature has defined fraudulent deceit as follows: "One
who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his
position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he
thereby suffers."4 The fraud exception provides that an action for
relief on the grounds of fraud must be commenced within three years
Valencias bore navel oranges long after the statutory period had run.
37. See generally Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 106 (1980).
38. See Brief for Plaintiff, at 2-13, Newlander v. Newlander, Civ. No. C 319 815 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct., filed May 26, 1983).
39. CAL. Civ. Pitoc. CODE § 338.4 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1984) reads:
An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in
that case is not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the ag-
grieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.
Id. See Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 107.
40. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1709 (Deering 1971).
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after the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud41
regardless of when the fraud occurred. In fraud cases, applying the
discovery rule is justified because the plaintiff's ignorance is the re-
sult of the deeds or words of the defendant. Hence, the plaintiff's
unawareness is central to the wrong42 and provides equitable reasons
for extending the statutory period. The main quandary is whether
incest is a fraud or similar enough to a fraud that one might plead
this tort to gain discovery accrual of the statute of limitations.
The elements of fraud which give rise to a tort action for deceit
are: (1) material misrepresentation by defendant; (2) defendant's
knowledge of its falsity; (3) defendant's intent to defraud; (4) justifia-
ble reliance by plaintiff; and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff.4
To fit within the fraud cause of action, an incest survivor would have
to prove that she was coaxed into sexual participation by a relative's
misrepresentation of a material fact which was made to her with
knowing falsity. 44 Further proof would be required to show that the
victim justifiably relied to her detriment upon the relative's misrepre-
sentations. 4' For both legal and factual reasons, manipulation of in-
cest cases to fit the misrepresentation cause of action appears unsuit-
able in most cases.
California case law asserts that where a complaint and the evi-
dence make out a claim for relief based on fraud, but the fraud is
41. See CAL. CIV. PRoC. CODE § 338 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1984).
42. Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 107.
43. 4 B. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 446 (8th ed. 1974).
44. The scienter element of fraud may be frustrated by the fact that fathers who commit
incest often rationalize the events. An offender stated, "In my own mind back then I thought I
was doing her a favor. I made myself feel that I was not doing anything wrong, that I was
actually sexually educating her." J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 24; see J. RENVOIZE, supra
note 1, at 70-71.
Incestuous fathers find many ways to rationalize abuse of their daughters. Blair and Rita
Justice categorize the most common misrepresentation patterns in their book THE BROKEN
TABOO, supra note 4, at 67-75.
The rationalizer, they observe, uses lofty words and sentiments as well as plausible
sounding reasoning for establishing an incestuous relationship. Some men justify their sexual
activity and persuade their daughters on the basis of showing them what love is. Another type
of incestuous father misrepresents himself as a teacher and rationalizes the incest as a type of
sex education. Other fathers insist that they are protecting their daughters by satisfying the
girls' sexual needs so that they will not be exposed to "bad" men. Id. at 67-75.
45. An adult incest survivor stated:
I didn't even know that it didn't happen in everybody's family. Daddy told me it
was natural and he was just teaching me the facts of life. I never knew that he
wasn't telling me the truth. He had books and everything, used diagrams and
made me learn the parts of the body. It wasn't until I was in fifth grade that I
began to understand that everybody's daddy didn't do that.
S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 31.
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only incidentally involved, the date-of-discovery commencement of
the statutory period may not always apply."' When the incest victim
is able to assert a claim for fraud, the fraud involved is only inciden-
tal as the real gist of the claim is personal injury. In cases of fraud,
date-of-discovery accrual begins when the plaintiff has actual knowl-
edge, or the means to reach the knowledge that would reveal the
fraud.4 7 An incest victim, although perhaps initially deceived by a
relative's assertions of propriety, does not often remain deceived for
long. 8 Her cognizance brings her great shame and pain, but also
dissolves the factual situation necessary for asserting a cause of ac-
tion for fraud. If the plaintiff does not justifiably rely on the rela-
tive's misrepresentation, no fraud is possible. Many incest victims
know the wrongness of their deeds, but continue to participate be-
cause of threats or because they feel the incestuous contact is the only
contact they can receive. Ironically, these victims lose the benefit of
the continued tolling of the statute of limitations at the polint of this
awareness.
The successful assertion of a cause of action for fraud would
bring a limited number of incest victims in under the date-of-discov-
ery exception. However, in the vast majority of incest cases, pursuit
of a fraud remedy is an impractical means to escape the standard
date-of-injury accrual. Because it is almost certain that actual or
constructive knowledge of the incest/fraud will come before the age
of majority,49 the fraud discovery exception is of little use to adult
incest survivors.
Even though the tort of fraud itself is generally an inappropri-
ate legal vehicle for incest survivors, the reasoning which caused
courts to allow discovery accrual in cases of fraud may be argued by
analogy to extend discovery accrual to incest cases brought under
other tort theories.
46. See also Goodnow v. Parker, 112 Cal. 437, 44 P. 738 (1896); San Fili ppo v. Grif-
fiths, 51 Cal. App. 3d 640, 645, 124 Cal. Rptr. 399, 403 (1975).
47. Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal. 2d 423, 106 P.2d 423 (1940) held that in alleging the
discovery of the fraud after the expiration of the period of limitations, the plaintiff must show
that he had no means of knowledge or notice which, followed by inquiry, would have shown
the circumstances on which the cause of action is founded.
48. One researcher stated: "Although many of the informants were too young to have a
clear idea of the significance of the father's behavior, the father's furtive behavior usually
indicated to the daughter that there was something wrong with what they were doing." J. L.
HERMAN, supra note 3, at 86. See also supra note 45.
49. See supra note 31.
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B. Undue Influence and Duress
The combined rigidity of the date-of-injury rule and the narrow
fraud cause of action has prompted courts to seek options which
would make the discovery exception more widely available. Within
the statutory fraud exception, a few decisions"0 have extended a ver-
sion of discovery accrual in cases where the defendant exerts undue
influence"' or duress"2 on the plaintiff.
Undue influence is often inferred from confidential relationships
in which a donee has exerted such power over the donor as to cause
the donor to confer a benefit against her will. 58 Typically, cases of
this nature center around the attempted rescission of a contract, or
the invalidation of a deed or instrument which was the product of
the undue influence the donee exercised upon the donor." Plaintiffs
in these cases allege that the effects of the undue influence or duress
practiced by the defendant should toll the statute of limitations.
50. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 392 (1979); Wade v. Busby, 66 Cal. App. 2d 700, 152 P.2d 754 (1944); Trubody v.
Trubody, 137 Cal. 172, 69 P. 968 (1902). See also Triplett v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 135,
74 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1969). But see Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 770, 236
P.2d 201 (1951).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1575 (Deering 1971) states:
Undue influence consists:
I. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds
a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the
purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him;
2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or
3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage or another's necessities or
distress.
Id.
52. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1569 (Deering 1971) defines duress as follows:
Duress is:
I. Unlawful confinement of the person of the party, or the husband or wife of
such party, or the ancestor, descendant, or adopted child of such party, husband
or wife;
2. Unlawful detention of the property of any such person; or
3. Confinement of such person, lawful in form, but fraudulently obtained, or
fraudulently made unjustly harassing or oppressive.
Id.
53. Annot., 121 A.L.R. 1294 (1939): "[Undue influence] constitutes a substitute of the
will of one person for that of another and deprives [her] of free agency." Id.
54. See Marshall v. Packard-Bell Co., 106 Cal. App. 770, 236 P.2d 201 (1951). Here
the plaintiff alleged duress in an action for recovery of money from a quasi-contractual benefit
paid by plaintiff to the defendant as a result of alleged illegal business compulsion.
In Triplett v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 135, 74 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1969), the remainder-
men of a trust established by the will of a deceased wife, brought an action against legatees of
the will of the deceased husband alleging that husband had unduly influenced his wife to
transfer sums of money into a joint bank account.
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When studied, the facts of incest are not distant from those sur-
rounding an instrument or deed which is created by coercion. Incest,
like undue influence, is the abuse of a confidential relationship in
which one person takes aggressive advantage of another."5 In incest
cases, however, the property transferred as a result of the undue in-
fluence is the child's person rather than land or a trust fund.
In cases of undue influence and duress, some courts apply an
even more lenient version of the fraud-based discovery exception to
the statute of limitations.
[Tihe [statutory] period begins with the termination of the in-
fluence or duress, the courts sometimes achieving this result by
utilizing the fraud exception. While the plaintiff may have
knowledge of the essential facts in either case, the later date of
commencement recognizes that [s]he will not be likely to sue
immediately. Thus, undue influence effectively conceals the
wrong resulting from the facts of which [sihe is aware; persua-
sion replaces misrepresentation ...
Similarly, where an act or omission is induced by threat or
exertion of physical force, the fear that compels submission
would ordinarily be sufficient to prevent suit for redress so long
as the duress continues. Since the plaintiff is aware of all the
relevant facts and their consequences, [s]he is charged with a
duty to sue when duress terminates.5"
The undue influence and duress application of the discovery
rule is founded on the belief that the statutory period equitably
should not begin to run against a plaintiff until the restrictive effects
of the undue influence or duress have concluded. In cases of contin-
ued duress or undue influence, the statute of limitations does not run
until the duress or undue influence ceases, even though plaintiff pre-
viously "discovered" the injury. Given the circumstances surrounding
incest, application of this version of the discovery rule would be
highly desirable for adult incest survivors.
In most jurisdictions, both duress and undue influence are sub-
categories of fraud."7 California recognizes duress as a form of
fraud"8 and applies the fraud-based discovery exception to such
55. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1575 (Deering 1971).
56. Note, supra note 32, at 1219 (emphasis added); see also Dawson, Undiscovered
Fraud and the Statutes of Limitation,'31 MICH. L. REV. 591, 610-16 (1933) (discussion of
various "constructive frauds" including undue influence) [hereinafter cited as Undiscovered
Fraud].
57. See Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 56, at 614-18.
58. O'Neil v. Spillane, 45 Cal. App. 3d 147, 119 Cal. Rptr. 245, 253-54 (1975).
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cases." Only a few California decisions support suspending the stat-
ute of limitations past the time of discovery in cases of duress 0 and
undue influence. 1 However, there is some indication that courts may
accept such an argument in response to the unique facts which char-
acterize incest cases.62
As stated previously, in some undue influence cases, the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until the restrictive effects of the
59. Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 207-08, 347 P.2d 12, 20-21, 1 Cal. Rptr. 12,
20-21 (1959).
60. See supra note 56. In Miller v. Bechtel Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 868, 663 P.2d 177, 191
Cal. Rptr. 619 (1983) a woman alleged that she was intimidated into relinquishing stock by
threats that her former husband would lose his job if she did not do so. The wife further
asserted that because of this intimidation and the great emotional strain, she lacked the capac-
ity to meaningfully consent. She pleaded that these factors should extend the statute of limita-
tions beyond its normal term. The court asserted that in absence of the allegation that either
the effect of her alleged intimidation or her incapacity extended beyond the time she signed the
agreement, the statute of limitations barred her suit. Id. at 876, 663 P.2d at 182, 191 Cal. Rptr.
at 624.
Therefore, by implication, if a plaintiff asserts that the intimidation exerted upon her by
the defendant extended beyond the time of discovery, the statute of limitations would be tolled
until the undue influence ceased.
61. See supra note 56.
62. In Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 788, 598 P.2d 45, 54, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 392, 401 (1979) the court asserts:
Just as the statute of limitations does not run against an action based on fraud
so long as the fraud remains concealed, so ought the statute to be tolled even
after the fraud is discovered, so long as the sheer economic duress or undue
influence imbedded in the fraud contrives to hold the victim in place.
Id. (emphasis in original).
This statement reveals the California court's willingness to extend the date-of-discovery excep-
tion in cases of fraud worsened by undue influence or duress. It does not, however, address the
issue of whether the court would be willing to suspend the running of the statute of limitations
past the date of discovery in cases of personal injury induced by undue influence.
Miller v. Bechtel Corp., 33 Cal. 2d 868, 663 P.2d 177,191 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1983), Wade v.
Busby, 66 Cal. App. 2d 700, 152 P.2d 754 (1944), and Trubody v. Trubody, 137 Cal. 172, 69
P. 968 (1902) are all in accord in holding that the statute of limitations may be tolled when the
plaintiff shows weakness and the defendant asserts undue influence. These cases all mention
fraud as the basis for action and are concerned with some type of property.
However, in Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Cal. 2d 195, 207, 347 P.2d 12, 20-21, I Cal. Rptr. 12,
20-21 (1959) the court stated:
The theory of recovery is not clear. But whether it be considered a suit for
restitution to recover money paid under duress, . . . or an action for money had
and received sounding in tort, . . . or, simply an action for money damages for
the tortious conduct of the defendants resulting in injury to the plaintiffs, the
basic nature of the wrongdoing of these defendants is duress.
Id.
Leeper reveals the court's willingness to toll the statute of limitations during the period of
duress regardless of the theory of recovery on which the claim is based. Assertions of undue
influence or duress may be sufficient to bring a cause of action for money damages resulting
from a defendant's tortious and incestuous conduct under the Wyatt rule. Thus the statute of
limitations would be tolled until the duress or undue influence ends.
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undue influence or duress have ceased." The reasoning which per-
mits the extension of the statute of limitations in undue influence
cases is especially applicable to the unique factual situation of incest.
Due to the adverse consequences stemming from the victim's revela-
tion of the incestuous acts, the incest victim is often trapped in a
"conspiracy of silence," and like the victim of duress or undue influ-
ence" is unable to reveal her secret or to bring a timely cause of
action."e An incest victim is influenced by the likelihood that re-
vealing her secret may be at the expense of her relationship with her
mother, her family's continued financial support, and her sibling's
companionship."6 In addition, the incest victim often fears the
threats, violence and/or loss of attention from the perpetrator. Ac-
cordingly, the victim's fears regarding the detrimental results of such
a revelation make a timely enforceable claim against the perpetrator
highly unlikely.6" Thus, it is clear that the equitable reasons which
justify the tolling of the statute of limitations in undue influence and
duress cases are equally applicable to incest. If the statute of limita-
tions rationale applied to some undue influence cases6" were also ap-
plied to incest, the statutory period would not begin to run automati-
cally when the injury was discovered, nor when the victim attained
majority. Instead, courts would decide on a case-by-case basis when
the victim reasonably could have been expected to act on her own
behalf, free from the undue influence or duress occasioned by the
perpetrator. In some situations, application of this undue influence
extension could provide the most equitable option for adult incest
survivors.
C. Fiduciary Relationships
The fraud basis for relief has provided a common starting point
for many of the discovery accrual exceptions to the statute of limita-
tions.6 9 California courts have given new meaning to the fraud-based
63. See text at note 56 supra.
64. Little v. Bank of Wadesboro, 187 N.C. I, 121 S.E. 185 (1924); Keyton v. i)owney, 81
Ind. App. 431, 143 N.E. 526 (1924).
65. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 130.
66. See supra note 8; see also K. MEISELMAN, supra note 9, at 185-89.
67. J. L. HERMAN, supra note 3, at 129.
68. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
69. See Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 56, at 607-26; see Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y.
261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910) (larceny with active concealment termed fraud); Tom Reed Gold Mines
Co. v. United Eastern Mining Co., 39 Ariz. 533, 8 P.2d 449 (1932) (underground tresspass
termed fraud).
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discovery exceptions in cases when a fiduciary 0 or confidential 7' re-
lationship exists between the parties. In cases of fiduciary relation-
ships, courts have relaxed the definition of what constitutes a plain-
tiff's constructive knowledge of her injury72 and have increased the
duty of the fiduciary to make disclosures to the beneficiary.73 This
increased duty of disclosure has created the legal fiction which brings
fiduciary relationships within the fraud-based discovery exception.
In Amen v. Merced County Title Co.74 the California Supreme
Court stated,
Cases in which the defendant stands in a fiduciary relationship
to the plaintiff are frequently treated as if they involved fraudu-
lent concealment of the cause of action by the defendant. The
theory is that although the defendant makes no active misrepre-
sentation, this element is supplied by an affirmative obligation
to make full disclosure, and the non-disclosure itself is a
fraud.7 5
Through this fiction, fiduciary relationships are brought within
fraud-based discovery-of-injury accrual for the purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.
Other cases have shown that the fraud fiction raised by a fiduci-
70. See Dabney v. Philleo, 38 Cal. 2d 60, 237 P.2d 648 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Laraway v. First Nat'l Bank, 39 Cal. App. 2d 718, 104 P.2d 95 (1940).
In Tidwell v. Richman, 127 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Cal. 1953), modified 234 F.2d 361 (9th
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957), the court held that when there is a confidential
relationship, and a cestui places reliance on a fiduciary, the California period of limitations
does not commence until the time of discovery of the alleged fraud.
72. The California Supreme Court has described this diminished duty as follows:
"[Dluring the continuance of this professional relationship, which is fiduciary in nature, the
degree of diligence required of a [plaintiff] in ferreting out and learning the negligent causes of
his condition is diminished." Sanchez v. South Hoover Hosp., 18 Cal. 3d 93, 102, 553 P.2d
1129, 1135, 132 Cal. Rptr. 657 663 (1976). See also Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 563,
544, 305 P.2d 20, 35 (1956); Schneider v. Union Oil Co., 6 Cal. App. 3d 987, 86 Cal. Rptr.
315 (1970).
73. See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188-90, 491
P.2d 421, 428-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844-46 (1971).
74. 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962).
75. Id. at 534, 375 P.2d at 36, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (citing Dawson, Fraudulent Con-
cealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REV. 875, 887-93 (1933)); See Note, supra
note 32, at 1214-17.
When the statutory period on any cause of action springing from a fiduciary relationship
lapses without the actual knowledge of the beneficiary, this implies two breaches, one of the
fiduciary duty, and the other of a breach of duty for non-disclosure of material facts.
Postponement of accrual of the cause of action until the client discovers, or
should discover, the material facts in issue vindicates the fiduciary duty of full
disclosure; it prevents the fiduciary from obtaining immunity for an initial
breach of duty by subsequent breach of obligation of disclosure.
Neel, 6 Cal. 3d at 189, 491 P.2d at 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
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ary's failure to make affirmative disclosures is not necessary to trig-
ger discovery accrual. The very existence of a cause of action against
a fiduciary makes discovery accrual applicable. 6 Early cases limited
discovery accrual to instances when the fiduciary had some profes-
sional obligation to the plaintiff." However, later California cases
illustrate that discovery accrual is not limited to causes of action
against professionals.7 8
The special characteristics of particular fiduciary relationships
have led courts to further soften the application of the discovery ex-
ception to the statute of limitations. Courts require a lesser standard
of diligence where informal confidential relationships exist than is
required in legally established fiduciary relationships.79 In some
types of fiduciary relationships, the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the fiduciary relationship has terminated and an
accounting has been rendered.8" Furthermore, in cases involving fi-
duciary relationships, the plaintiff asserting discovery of damage or
injury need not prove that no means of earlier knowledge of the
damage existed. She need only "establish facts sufficient to show that
[s]he made an actual discovery of hitherto unknown information
76. Amen, 58 Cal. 2d at 534, 375 P.2d at 36, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 68; Rafter v. Hurd, 136
Kan. 127, 129, 12 P.2d 837, 839 (1932); Undiscovered Fraud, supra note 56, at 610-21.
77. This principle has been applied in actions against the following fiduciaries: trust-
ees-Courtelyou v. Imperial Land Co., 166 Cal. 14, 134 P. 981 (1913); stockbroker-Twomey
v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968);
escrow agents-Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 65 (1962); insurance agents-Walker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 183 Cal. App. 2d 513, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 924 (1960); real estate agents-Allsopp v. Joshua Hardy Mach. Works, 5 Cal. App.
228, 90 P. 39 (1907); accountants-Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cfl. Rptr. 55
(1967); physicians-Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936); attorneys-Neel v.
Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1971).
78. Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 106-12 Cases decided after Neel have
utilized the fiduciary relationship reasoning to extend the discovery exceptions beyond the pro-
fessions listed in note 77. A California court in Seelenfreund v. Terminix of N. Cal., Inc. 84
Cal. App. 3d 133; 148 Cal. Rptr. 307 (1978) extended the delayed discovery rule to termite
inspections which were made negligently and in Allred v. Bekins Wide World Van Serv., 45
Cal. App. 3d 984, 120 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1975) to goods packaged in vermin-infested packing
material. This expansion reveils that the utilization of the discovery exception is not limited to
those cases involving a professional obligation. The discovery exception may also be invoked in
nonprofessional relationships where a cogent reason exists for the tardy discovery of injury.
79. Note, supra note 32, at 1216; See Knapp v. Knapp, 15 Cal. 2d 237, 100 P.2d 759
(1940); Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945); Dabney v. Philleo,
38 Cal. 2d 60, 237 P.2d 648 (1951); Bennett v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 305 P.2d 20
(1956); Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal. App. 278, 295 P.2d 113 (1956); Sidebotham v. Robinson,
216 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1954).
80. Note, supra note 32, at 1216; But see United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-
Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 596, 463 P.2d 770, 776, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423-24 (1970).
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within [the statutory period]." '8 1
These more lenient applications of the date-of-discovery excep-
tion in cases of fiduciary and confidential relationships are very help-
ful to extend the causes of action of the adult incest survivors. Almost
all adults molested as children are aware of some emotional or phys-
ical trauma at the time of the incest itself. Therefore, the discovery
exception, under its standard meaning, would be of little use to in-
cest victims unless the plaintiffs duty of inquiry were relaxed. The
less rigorous duty of inquiry required in confidential relationships
works to the advantage of incest survivors by tolling the statute of
limitations if previously unknown information is uncovered.8"
The same beneficial tolling will occur if the adult incest survi-
vors are able to analogize their incestuous relationships to commer-
cial fiduciary relationships where the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until the fiduciary relationship is finally terminated and
an "accounting" is made.8" This analogy, like the undue influence
reasoning discussed previously, would lead to a factual determination
as to when the fiduciary aspect of the parent-child relationship con-
cluded. Perhaps, under this theory, a civil claim could be initiated
after an extended period following the victim's nineteenth birthday.
Finally, perhaps most importantly, research reveals that most
incest victims become aware of previously unknown emotional dam-
age caused by the incestuous relationship long after they reach adult-
hood.84 Thus, the discovery of "hitherto unknown information" such
as the nature, extent, or causation of incest-related psychological in-
jury would begin the running of the statutory period.8 If courts ac-
81. Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 442, 159 P.2d 958, 975 (1945).
82. See supra note 79.
83. See supra notes 80 and notes 8-28 and accompanying text
An "accounting" signifies that the fiduciary relationship is over and that the fiduciary
must now account to the beneficiary as to how the subject of the fiduciary relationship was
handled.
To form an analogy between the commercial fiduciary relationship and an incestuous
relationship requires the court to determine when the parental fiduciary relationship ended for
purposes of beginning the statute of limitations. The topic of the trial would be an "account-
ing" as to how the fiduciary handled the child.
84. See supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
85. In Newlander v. Newlander Civ. No. C 219 815 (Los Angeles Cty., Super. Ct.,
1983) the plaintiff, Lorey Newlander stated that she was unaware that she had been damaged
by her incestuous experiences until she had therapy after an abortion. Shortly thereafter, she
had a nervous breakdown, was hospitalized and later came to understand that she was injured
as a direct and proximate result of the incest. Id. (citing Brief for Plaintiff at 13).
The authority of Lorey Newlander's experience of "hitherto unknown facts" is graphi-
cally illustrated by the experience of Evelyn, another adult incest survivor:
When I was seventeen I had my first consenting sexual relationship with a man
[Vol. 25
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cept incestuous relationships as analogous to fiduciary relationships,
the possibility of a less stringent application of the statute of limita-
tions will provide hope for adult incest victims.
Under California law, parent-child relationships are considered
fiduciary relationships." Although most fiduciary relationships are
governed by standards of professional negligence, 87 the parent-child
fiduciary relationship is governed by the standard of
reasonableness.88
Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and disci-
pline his child and confers the right to prescribe a course of
reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has a wide
discretion in the performance of his parental functions, but that
discretion does not include the right willfully to inflict personal
injuries beyond the limits of reasonable parental discipline.8
and suddenly was flooded with memories which had been repressed about sex-
ual behavior between my father and me. It was really overwhelming, and I was
unable to remember what had been buried for more than five years .... The
power of the things I do remember was so great that I had to close everything
off.
S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 48.
86. Cf MacDermot v. Hayes, 175 Cal. 95, 106, 170 P. 616 (1917); In re Estate of
Snowball, 157 Cal. 301, 107 P. 598 (1910); Burrows v. Jorgensen, 323 P.2d 150, 158 Cal.
App. 2d 644 (1958); Menick v. Goldy, 131 Cal. App. 2d 542, 280 P.2d 844 (1955).
California has arguably created a fiduciary duty between parent and child by statute as
well as through case law. In 1974, the legislature passed the Uniform Parentage Act. Califor-
nia Civil Code Section 7001 was adopted as part of the Act; it reads in pertinent part:
"[Plarent and child relationship" means the legal relationship existing between
a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or
imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and
child relationship and the father and child relationship.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7001 (added by ch. 244, § 11, Stat. 1975) (West 1983).
87. The elements of professional negligence are:
1) the duty of the professional to use skills, prudence and diligence as other
members of his profession commonly possess and exercise;
2) breach of that duty;
3) a proximate causal connection between negligent conduct and resulting in-
jury; and
4) actual loss or damage resulting from professional's negligence.
Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971). But see
supra note 78.
88. The Gibson court stated:
The standard to be applied is the traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed
in light of the parental role. Thus, we think the proper test of a parent's con-
duct is this: what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done
in similar circumstances?
Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971)
(action for negligence against parent).
89. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 429-30, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (1955) (action for
intentional tort) (emphasis added); see also Gillett v. Gillett, 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d
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Incest is neither reasonable nor within the bounds of parental
discretion." Incest is a breach of the fiduciary duty of a parent to his
child. 1 Thus, the date-of-discovery exceptions which obtain when a
fiduciary relationship has been breached should include incest as a
breach of parental fiduciary responsibility. A softened application of
the statute of limitations would provide quite hopeful remedial pos-
sibilities for adult incest survivors.
D. Professional Malpractice
Medical and professional malpractice suits have consistently
utilized the California delayed discovery rule.9" Similarities exist be-
736 (1959) (action for intentional tort with stepmother).
90. Codified evidence of the societal taboo against incest is found in CAL. PENAL CODE§ 285 (incest); § 286(C) (sodomy with a minor); § 288a(b)(2) (oral copulation with a minor
under violent circumstances); and § 288 (lewd and lascivious acts with children).
The "unreasonableness" of incest is further evidenced in three suits daughters have re-
cently won against their fathers. In Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980), a stepdaugh-
ter was awarded $42,000 in damages against her stepfather for sexual assault and battery. In
X v. Melder, 3 Civil 20125 (Butte Cty. Super. Ct., refiled Feb. 1983) the daughter was
awarded $906,465. In Kalamazoo, Mich., Circuit Court Judge Robert Borsos sentenced Roger
Gauntlett, an heir to the Upjohn pharmaceutical fortune, to a year in jail and five years of
"chemical castration" with Depo-Provera, an Upjohn product. TIME, Feb. 13, 1984, at 73.
91. "A fiduciary relationship arises whenever confidence is reposed on one side, and
domination and influence result on the other; [whether] the relation be legal, social, domestic
or merely personal." Estate of Heilman v. Burson, 37 Ill. App. 3d 390, 345 N.E.2d 536
(1976).
The apparent flaw in the application of the fiduciary duty to incest cases exists in the fact
that most legal fiduciary relationships involve two people and an independent property, busi-
ness, contract, or estate. The essence of the fiduciary relationship arises from the fact that one
party, the beneficiary, reposes confidence in the other, the fiduciary. The status of being a
fiduciary gives rise to certain legal duties, mainly the obligation to refrain from abusing the
confidence of the beneficiary by obtaining any advantage at the expenses of the confiding party.
Bacon v. Bacon, 150 Cal. 477, 89 P. 317 (1907); Cover's Estate, 188 Cal. 133, 204 P. 583
(1922).
In a parent-child relationship where it is asserted that incest is a breach of the fiduciary
duty, no independent piece of property, contract, or trust fund exists. The corpus of the trust,
instead, is the "corpus" of the child. The breach of the fiduciary duty stems not from misman-
agement of a property for the benefit of the fiduciary, but from a transgression of trust. This
substitution of the well-being of the child for the property, found in the usual fiduciary rela-
tionship, provides a more compelling reason for application of the delayed discovery rule to
incest under the fiduciary relationship reasoning.
The reasoning is supported by the fact that doctor-patient relationships are included
under the fiduciary relationship discovery exception. Doctor-patient relationships, like parent-
child relationships, are not centered around independent property but instead focus on the
services that one party gives another. This similarity supports the assertion that incestuous
parent-child relationships belong within the discovery exception.
92. Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936) was the first decision in any
state to utilize a date-of-discovery rule for accrual of actions for medical malpractice cases.
Once classified within the one-year limit of the CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340, medical mal-
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tween the reasons for extending the delayed discovery rule for pro-
fessional malpractice and the reasons which urge applying it to cases
of adult survivors of incest.
Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy & Gelfand,93 is a critical Cali-
fornia decision which applied the delayed discovery rule to actions
for professional malpractice against attorneys. In Neel, the court set
forth reasoning to justify the delay of the limitations period in attor-
ney malpractice actions and in those against all professionals. First,
attorneys are obliged to follow not only a standard of reasonable
care, but are also bound by a standard of professional care. 94 Second,
because the injury in a legal malpractice case may be concealed in
technical jargon, it is reasonable to assume that only another profes-
sional would detect it.9' Third, the fiduciary relationship between
attorney and client obliges full disclosure on the part of the attorney,
without which he is guilty of fraud. Consequently, failure to disclose
an injury in and of itself would automatically invoke the delayed
discovery rule.96
These three reasons offered by the Neel court to justify apply-
ing discovery accrual to attorney-client relationships are equally ap-
plicable to incestuous relationships. Fathers, like attorneys, are held
to a higher standard of care than the ordinary person. Further, the
practice cases now fall under a separate statute in § 340.5. Section 340.5 provides for a one-
year period of limitation from discovery of the cause of action, but bars any action filed more
than three years from the date of the injury unless proof is offered of fraud, intentional con-
cealment or presence of a foreign body.
The principle that a professional negligence or malpractice action does not accrue until
discovery, has also been applied to other professionals. Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58
Cal. 2d 528, 375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962) (escrowholders); Moonie v. Lynch, 256
Cal. App. 2d 361, 64 Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967) (accountants); Twomey v. Mitchem, Jones, &
Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968) (stockbrokers); Cook v.
Redwood Empire Title Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 452, 79 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1969) (title companies);
United States. Liab. Ins. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d 770, 83 Cal. Rptr.
418 (1970) (insurance agents).
Haidinger-Hayes set forth the general rule that in actions for all professional malprac-
tice, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered
the negligence. The lone exception to that rule, legal malpractice cases, was eliminated in Ned
v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1971).
93. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187-88, 491 P.2d 421, 428-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 844 (1971).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 188-89, 491 P.2d at 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 845.
97. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) held that
parents should be held to a higher standard than the usual objective reasonableness standard
because of their position as parents. See supra note 88. This elevated duty is comparable to the
elevated duty attorneys have with their clients.
This duty was offered in Neel as a reason to extend the discovery exception to legal
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damage resulting from incest, the "incest syndrome" is akin to the
damage resulting from attorney malpractice. For example, like the
injury inherent in a faulty will, incest related injury is displayed
openly on the "page" of the victim's character and personality. How-
ever, such damage often remains uncomprehended and thus undis-
covered until a professional examination by a therapist or a coun-
selor occurs. The necessity for professional examination which
results in the discovery of the injury, likens incest to legal and pro-
fessional malpractice for purposes of discovery accrual.9
In Neel, the court further justified the application of the delayed
discovery rule by emphasizing the fiduciary duty between the par-
ties." This factor as well as much of the reasoning in the Neel deci-
sion, is especially applicable to the factual circumstances in the cases
of adult survivors of incest. "Where the reason is the same, the rule
should be the same."' 00 Thus, date-of-discovery accrual which ap-
plies to professional malpractice should also apply to incest.
E. Inherently Undiscoverable Injuries
California courts have regularly refused to apply time-of-injury
accrual in cases when the nature of the injury makes the injury diffi-
malpractice; "the special obligation of the professional is exemplified by his duty not merely to
perform his work with ordinary care, but to use the skill, prudence and diligence commonly
exercised by practitioners of his profession." 6 Cal. 3d 176, 188, 491 P.2d 421, 428-29, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 837, 844. Thus, when this elevated duty exists, as in parent-child relationships, there
also exists a reason to extend the discovery exception.
98. This reasoning is well explained in the medical malpractice context in Burns v. Bell,
409 A.2d 614, 616 (D.C. 1979). Here the court noted that in medical malpractice cases, the
patient is often unaware of his injury both because of his tendency to rely on his physician's
care and because many medical injuries do not become apparent to a lay person for many
years. The court held that the delayed discovery rule applied to all medical malpractice cases,
reasoning that when an injury is not apparent, the discovery rule strikes a fair balance be-
tween the plaintiff's right to seek judicial relief and the medical defendant's interest in freedom
from stale claims. Id. See generally Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936);
Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 116 Cal. App. 2d 445, 454-55, 254 P.2d 85, 91 (1953);
Garlock v. Cole, 199 Cal. App. 2d 11, 18 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1962); Mock v. Santa Monica Hosp.,
187 Cal. App. 2d 57, 64, 9 Cal. Rptr. 555, 560 (1960); Hundley v. St. Francis Hosp., 161 Cal.
App. 2d 800, 327 P.2d 131 (1958); N.H. Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co. 262 Cal. App. 2d 330,
340-41, 68 Cal. Rptr. 617, 623-24 (1968).
In Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969),
the plaintiff did not realize there was a connection between the drug she had ingested at her
doctor's order, the bodily distress she experienced during pregnancy, and the cerebral palsy
affliction of her son, until her attorney suggested the drug might have been responsible.
Likewise, in incest cases damages are often not "discovered" by the plaintiff until a pro-
fessional suggests the linkage not perceived by the plaintiff's unprofessional eye.
99. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 190, 491 P.2d 421, 429, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837, 845 (1971).
100. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3511 (Deering 1983).
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cult to discover within the statutory period. Courts have granted eq-
uitable exceptions to plaintiffs when there is a "lack of actual or
perceptible trauma" 10 1 at the time of the initial injury. When an
"insidious and creeping disease"'' renders the timely discovery of
the injury improbable, the delayed discovery rule has been applied.
Furthermore, when "a silent and insidious onset of injury or its ef-
fects" '03 makes discovery of the initial injury within the statutory
period unlikely, courts have also utilized the date of discovery to
commence the statutory period.
Workers' compensation cases are early examples of discovery
accrual for inherently unknowable injuries. In Marsh v. Industrial
Accident Commission,'04 employees worked in a dust-laden atmo-
sphere. They did not become aware that the dust was the cause of
their serious health impairments until after the statutory period had
run. The court held that the statute of limitations should not inter-
fere with an injured employee's right to compensation during the
period in which the employee was reasonably ignorant of the cause
of the disability.' 05
In a workers' compensation case for silicone lung disease, the
court held:
No specific date of contact with the substance can be charged
with being the date of injury, in as much as the injurious conse-
quences of the exposure are the product of a period of time
rather than a point of time; consequently the afflicted employee
can be held to be "injured" only when the accumulated effects
of the deleterious substance manifest themselves.106
Incest injuries, like those of silicone dust, often do not manifest
101. Rubino v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 27-28, 266 P.2d 163, 168 (1954)
(quoting Warrington v. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131
(1969)).
102. Anderson v. Southern Pacific Co., 231 Cal. App. 2d 233, 41 Cal. Rptr. 743, 747
(1964) (quoting Warrington v. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567, 80 Cal. Rptr.
130, 131 (1969)).
103. Warrington at 567, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 131-32; see generally Ricciuti v. Voltare
Tubes, Inc., 277 F.2d 809, 812 (2nd Cir. 1960).
104. 217 Cal. 338, 18 P.2d 933 (1933).
105. Id. at 351-52, 18 P.2d at 938-39.
106. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 124 Cal. App. 378, 381,12
P.2d 1075-76 (1932) (emphasis added). See Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 103 (1949); Young v.
Clinchfield R.R. Co., 288 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir. 1961); Coots v. Southern Pac. Co., 49 Cal.
2d 805, 332 P.2d 460 (1958); Argonaut Inc. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 231 Cal. App.
2d 111, 41 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1964); Beveridge v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d
592, 346 P.2d 545 (1959); but see Turdich v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 237 Cal. App. 2d
455, 47 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1975).
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themselves at the time the injury occurs. Clinical psychologists who
specialize in the treatment of incest syndrome agree that the injury to
an incest victim most often does not manifest itself until the victim's
later life. The damage frequently reveals itself when the incest survi-
vor gives birth to her first female child.107
Further parallels to delayed discovery situations are revealed in
a recent case brought against a doctor and drug manufacturer. In
Warrington v. Pfizer & Co., Inc.,'0 8 the pregnant plaintiff, under
the assurance of her doctor, took a drug which resulted in her illness
and in the cerebral palsy affliction of her son. Here the court stated:
When personal injury is suffered without perceptible trauma
and by silent and insidious impregnation as a consequence of
the act or omission of another, who knows, or is charged with
the responsibility of knowing that such act may result in per-
sonal injury, and the injured person is unaware of the cause of
[her] injury, and could not, . . . without specialized knowl-
edge have been made aware of such cause, no action for tort
resulting from such cause begins to accrue until the injured per-
son knows or ...should have discovered the cause of such
injury.' 0'
In G. D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,"1 a case involving
damage sustained through the use of oral contraceptives, the court
applied discovery accrual where "the pathological effect occurs with-
out perceptible trauma and the plaintiff is blamelessly ignorant of
the cause of his injury." 1 '
The injury of incest is in many aspects, similar to these inher-
ently undiscoverable injuries. The injury is often suffered by a child
without perceptible trauma.112 It is perpetrated by a relative who
knows, or is charged with the responsibility of knowing, that such an
107. Newlander v. Newlander Civ. No. C 319-815. Brief for Plaintiff, at 13 (Los Ange-
les Cty. Super. Ct., filed May 26, 1983); see supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
108. 274 Cal. App. 2d 567, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1960).
109. Id. at 569-70, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 133 (emphasis added).
110. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
111. Id. at 25, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 220; see, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal., 503 F. Supp. 194
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (where the "pathological effects without perceptible trauma" standard is
applied to a Dalkon shield injury).
112. Research shows that the vast majority of incestuous relationships do not involve
intercourse. Children from the early ages of two to three may be fondled so unobstrusively as
to remain unaware that anything untoward is happening. Indeed, most incestuous activity
occurs without the use of overt force. A Seattle study reported that only 16% of the victims
were made to submit by the use of physical force. However, the emotional trauma which a
victim later suffers is not necessarily related to the apparent severity of the activity. J. RENVO-
IZE, supra note 1, at 26-27: see also supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
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act may result in injury.11 The damage, other than that which is
done to the child's body, occurs over a period of time rather than at
any particular point in time.1 4 The harm of the incestuous experi-
ence, like a creeping and insidious disease, manifests itself as the
child matures and experiences her adult life. An adult molested as a
child may be justifiably ignorant of the latent harm resulting from
incestuous childhood. Accordingly, a parallel appears between the
inherently unknowable injury of incest and the latent disease cases.
The analogy of incest to a latent disease, however, 'may be an
unnecessary exercise. Since 1971, no California cases have applied a
statute-of-limitations bar against a tardy plaintiff when the claim of
ignorance is supported by reasonable factual allegations. 16 In light
of this common experience of many incest survivors, the California
courts should find incest victims' ignorance of the causes or extent of
their incest-related injuries reasonable. To analogize incest damages
to these other types of inherently unknowable injuries could bring
adult incest survivors within the discovery exception.
F. Maturation of Harm in Negligence Actions
Another argument to urge delayed discovery accrual for incest
113. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
114. Research reveals that incest victims suffer from an identifiable and predictable se-
ries of problems which manifest a "depressive process." Rarely do the symptoms occur before
the age of 16. Hank Giaretto, director of Parents United, a nationally known San Jose sexual
abuse program stated,
The story is almost repetitious as far as those of our female adult clients who
were molested as children are concerned. Usually there is promiscuity during
teen-age [years], drugs, sometimes recourse to prostitution, followed by mar-
riage, then problems with sexual dysfunction. We see it again and again.
J. RENVOIZE, supra note 1, at 157-61. See also supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text.
115. Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 115-16.
Typical of these cases is Collins v. City of Los Angeles, 241 Cal. App. 2d 451, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 586 (2d Dist. 1966) where after stating "it is the time of the act and not the time of
discovery, which sets the statute [of limitations] in motion." Id. at 454-55, 50 Cal. Rptr. at
588. The court barred the suit stating that "there was no valid reason for the plaintiffs to
wait." Id. at 456, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 589. Conversely, given a valid reason for the plaintiff's
delay, the statute of limitations would offer no bar.
In Cain v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins., 62 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 860 (Ist
Dist. 1976), however, the court did not even demand a valid reason for the delay. The plain-
tiff's bare assertion of delayed discovery survived without further proof. This exception oc-
curred even though the basis of the suit was invasion of privacy, an apparently intrusive
injury.
In Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 88 Cal. App. 3d 725, 152 Cal. Rptr. 27
(1975), the court applied the discovery-of-injury exception to an action for libel with little
reasoning beyond citation to cases applying delayed discovery in other contexts. These cases
illustrate the extent of the California courts' movement away from strict date-of-injury accrual.
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survivors arises from the notion of maturation of harm under a neg-
ligence theory. When harm is an essential element of a cause of ac-
tion, the statute of limitations may not begin to run until a plaintiff
is actually harmed. In actions such as assault, battery, or breach of
contract, when the defendant's conduct itself invades the plaintiff's
rights, the statute begins to run once the conduct is completed."' But
in causes of action such as negligence or negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, no cause of action exists unless the plaintiff is
injured.1 1 7
Harm is an essential element in a negligence action. If the stat-
utory period started at the time of the conduct, but prior to the mat-
uration of harm, a plaintiff's remedy would be barred before the
cause of action came into existence. 1 Therefore, until the plaintiff
suffers "appreciable harm" as a consequence of the negligent act, no
cause of action for negligence exists. Furthermore, the statutory pe-
riod cannot commence before the "events have developed to a point
where [the] plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy." ' California
courts have displayed their willingness to utilize this "maturation of
harm" reasoning in cases of personal injury,12 property damage,
and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
For example, in Oakes v. McCarthy Co.,"' homeowners
brought suit against tract subdividers who had negligently filled and
graded their lots. Over a period of years, plaintiffs noticed gradual
damage resulting from land subsidence. The court ruled, "Only
116. Note, supra note 32, at 1200-01.
117. Id.; W PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 144 (4th ed. 1971); see e.g..,
Essex Wire v. M.H. Hilt. Co., 263 F.2d 599 (7th Cir. 1959). Both negligence and intentional
tort theories have been utilized in incest cases. See Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous
Abuse, 13 GOLDEN GATE 609, 627-28 (1983).
118. See supra note 117; see also Oakes v. McCarthy, 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 127 (1968). In Uric v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1948), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that a plaintiff could be held to be injured only when "the accumulated effects of the
deleterious substance manifested themselves." Id. at 170-71. Urie gave many jurisdictions an
incentive to enact a discovery exception in cases when the plaintiff's injury did not manifest
itself as actionable harm for a considerable amount of time.
California decisions regarding professional negligence have held that the mere breach of a
professional duty causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or a threat of future
harm-not yet realized-does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence. See Budd v.
Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 200, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1971); Neel v. Magana,
Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 491 P.2d 421, 427, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837,
843 (1971); Warrington v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 564, 566, 80 Cal. Rptr. 130,
1331 (1969).
119. Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 513, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705, 712
(1975).
120. Id.
121. 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1968).
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when . . . damage is sufficiently appreciable to a reasonable man
may we hold an owner to a duty of expeditiously pursuing his
remedies." '22
Aldaco v. Tropic Ice Cream Co.,"s indirectly established simi-
lar reasoning in the context of emotional distress. The Aldaco court
stated:
[Pihysical effects may not appear immediately after the emo-
tional trauma; indeed, in some cases, a significant period of time
may elapse before physical consequences develop. Until the
physical effects of the emotional distress appear, the last element
essential to a Dillon cause of action has not occurred, and events
have not developed to a point where the plaintiff is entitled to a
legal remedy.1" 4
Aldaco is indicative of the California courts' willingness to rec-
ognize that the effects of an emotionally distressing experience may
not manifest themselves until long after the emotional shock occurs.
The Aldaco court, however, discussed only the physical effects of
emotional distress. This element of the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress cause of action is no longer required under Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital.12 5 Therefore, if Molien and Aldaco
are read together, it could be asserted that a negligence cause of ac-
tion for incest does not accrue until the emotional damage, the "in-
cest syndrome," has manifested itself.
In the incest cases which do not involve violence or intercourse,
the actual damages at the time of the incest are nominal."" The
further harm that the child will suffer as a result of the incestuous
experience is only speculative at the time of the incest itself. It is
only when an incest victim appreciates sufficient actual consequent
harm that she should be held to the duty of pursuing her remedy in
122. Id. at 255, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 142 (emphasis added). See Fields v. Napa Milling Co.,
164 Cal. App. 2d 442, 447-48, 330 P.2d 459 (1958).
In Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969), the court
found that a cause of action for the subsidence of a house, years after the original damage had
been noted, would not be barred by the statute of limitations under the rule that each subsi-
dence was a separate cause of action. Id. at 617. When applied to incest, this rule of law would
analogize the incestuous childhood acts to the laying of a faulty foundation. Each incident of
damage arising thereafter from the "foundation" of incest, would initiate a new cause of ac-
tion, thus avoiding the problem of the statute of limitations.
123. 110 Cal. App. 3d 523, 168 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1980).
124. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 526, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 61 (1980). For listing of factors required
for a Dillon action see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72,
80, (discussed in 29 A.L.R. 3d 1316 (1968)).
125. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. (1980).
126. See supra note 112.
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a negligence cause of action.
An argument may be made that "[any appreciable and actual
harm flowing from . . . negligent conduct establishes a cause of ac-
tion upon which the client may sue. '127 It would appear that an
adult incest survivor, having endured the multiple components of the
"incest syndrome,"1 8 has suffered some appreciable harm and there-
fore is under a duty to pursue her remedy. However, the issue of
whether the damages resulting from incest are "sufficiently apprecia-
ble, is ultimately a question of fact.1 9 This factual determination
procedure should not be cut off by simple demurrer, but made avail-
able to adult incest victims.130
V. POLICY ISSUES
Three policy reasons have traditionally been offered to justify
the strict application of the statute of limitations. 3 The primary
rationale supporting the statute of limitations is one of fairness to
defendants.' A time should come when a potential defendant
"ought to be secure in his reasonable expectation that the slate has
been wiped clean of ancient obligations." ' The statute of limita-
tions is further justified as a safeguard against adjudication based on
stale evidence. The Supreme Court asserted, "The search for truth
may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death
or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
127. Budd v. Nixen, 6 Cal. 3d 195, 201, 491 P.2d 433, 436, 98 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852
(1971).
128. See supra notes 3-28 and accompanying text.
129. Oakes, 267 Cal. App. 2d at 255, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 142 (1968). "There are no hard
and fast rules for determining what facts or circumstances will compel inquiry by the injured
party and render him chargeable with knowledge. It is a question for the trier of facts."
United States Liab. Ins. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 597, 463 P.2d 770, 776, 83
Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (1970). See County of Kern v. Superior Ct. of Kern Cty., 82 Cal. App. 3d
396, 400, 147 Cal. Rptr, 248, 251 (1978).
130. See CAL. Civ. Paoc. CODE § 597 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1984). The legislature
anticipated the problem of determining the date of discovery and provided a procedure for
factual hearings when the issue of statute of limitations bar has been raised.
131. Although the reasons offered here are those traditionally given to justify the exis-
tence of the statute of limitations, they might also be offered to justify maintenance of the date-
of-injury rather than date-of-discovery accrual. As with the statute of limitations, date-of-in-
jury accrual generally excludes cases. Date-of-discovery accrual, however, achieves an effect
closer to that of having no statute of limitations at all.
132. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944)
(Even if one has a just claim, it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within
the period of limitation).
133. Note, supra note 32, at 1185.
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documents or otherwise."18 The statute of limitations also acts to
discourage prospective claimants from sleeping on their rights. 8 '
Presently, incest victims are limited in pursuing tort remedies to
initiation of a suit on or before the nineteenth birthday, one year
after attaining majority. Applying the delayed discovery rule to the
causes of action of adult incest survivors could foreseeably facilitate
initiating civil actions against the incestuous relatives at any point in
a victim's adult life. From a policy standpoint, to determine whether
adult incest injuries should be subject to the discovery rule, one must
examine the validity of the historical motivations for the statute of
limitations.
In situations involving incest, the defendant's interest in a guar-
antee of repose, or safety from litigation, is a poor reason to deny
application of the discovery rule. In limited situations, which are dis-
tinguishable from incest cases, this guarantee of repose is dispositive.
Doctors, for instance, are granted repose beyond a period of four
years from the date of injury.1"6 Unlimited malpractice liability
would drive the cost of malpractice insurance and essential medical
services too high, and accordingly the extension would be contrary to
the public good.18 7 However, there is no public benefit in shielding
incest perpetrators from the consequences of their actions, even years
after the deeds were committed. Civil law suits act as a deterrent to
socially unacceptable behavior. In light of the scope of the incest
problem 8' and the fact that abused children frequently become abu-
sive parents, 8 the deterrent value of civil suits is especially critical.
134. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. I11, 117 (1979). See Williams, Limitations Peri-
ods on Personal Injury Claims, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 881 (1973) "Most actions for personal
injuries depend to a great extent upon the testimony of witnesses, and the recollection of such
witnesses inevitably becomes less credible with the passage of time." Id.
135. Taylor, Occupational Disease: A Defense Attorney's Point of View, 12 FORUM 297,
300-01 (1976). "A plaintiff's diligence is required because at some point, the filing of a com-
plaint becomes so distant from the situation which gives rise to the claim as to make the
burden of defense intolerable." Id.
136. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (Deering 1972).
137. See generally Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
138. See WOODBURY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 7; see also D. FINKELHOR, supra note
7.
139. The well-documented fact that abused children become abusive parents is noted as
follows:
In nearly all of the studies of male sexual offenders that have been done to date,
well over half or in some cases nearly three-quarters of the men studied who are
serving time in prison were found to have been sexually abused as young boys.
... Therefore... from generation to generation, emotional, physical and sexual
abuse are behaviors exhibited by men who most likely experienced such abuse
19851
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These reasons far outweigh the defendant's need for a guarantee of
repose. 1
40
A stronger argument supporting strict application of the statute
of limitations for incest cases is the desire to foreclose claims which
are based on stale evidence.1'"The problem of faded memories and
vague recollections is particularly onerous in delayed civil actions for
incest. The evidentiary reasons for strict date-of-injury accrual seem
less compelling today, however, than they did in 1623 when the first
statute of limitations was enacted:1 42
[I]n 1623 . .. [j]udges were just beginning to see the need for
devices to protect against error from jurors' . . . reliance on un-
trustworthy evidence. The court had not yet developed exclu-
sionary rules .... [P]arties to the lawsuit were not allowed to
be witnesses. A Plaintiff could easily wait until the death or
departure of a defense witness to bring an action, knowing that
the defendant could not himself testify to rebut the charges. The
need for an inflexible statute of limitations to prevent injustices
must have seemed greater than it does now when more nar-
rowly tailored evidentiary rules eliminate unreliable evidence.1' 8
The modern exclusionary 144 and hearsay145 rules exclude evidence
which are unreliable or may create substantial danger of undue
prejudice. The function and effect of the modern rules of evidence 14"
in their own childhoods. Sadly, what these men learned from their parents, they
learned too well.
S. BUTLER, supra note 1, at 67.
140. When the adult incest survivor still has siblings at home, utilization of discovery
accrual could forestall their potential abuse. The generational problem of incest may not be
addressed, however, by a suit which occurs after the children have experienced the incest and
left home. The damage is done. A civil suit, at this point brings direct compensation to the
incest survivor for harm done to her. In addition, civil suits bring adult incest survivors oppor-
tunity for legal retribution. The societal benefit from retribution stems from publication to
potential offenders of the long-lasting and tangible consequences of incestuous activity. Fur-
thermore, providing access to civil suits for adult incest survivors allows them to act as adults,
equal in power to their fathers. This balance of power is not possible before the victim reaches
adulthood.
141. Note, supra note 32, at 1185; see also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 144 (4th ed. 1971).
142. The Act for Limitation of Actions and For Avoiding of Suits in Law, 21 JAC. I, c.
23 (1623) marked the beginning of the modern law of limitations in the common law. It estab-
lished different periods of limitation for different theories of liability.
143. Kelly, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury Statute of Limitaitons: Reflections
on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1641, 1645-46 (1978).
144. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1983).
145. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1200 (Deering 1983).
146. The strict rules of evidence sometimes work too effectively when excluding poten-
tially unreliable evidence. The rules of evidence exclude many out-of-court statements which
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supplant the evidenciary function of date-of-injury accrual.1 47 Thus,
these rules of evidence alone are sufficient to exclude unreliable or
prejudicial evidence proffered during trial.
Although it may be argued that the automatic exclusion of cases
under the date-of-injury bar is administratively more expedient, 148 to
screen worthy causes of action at the pleading stage rather than
through the trier of fact would be an "elevation of procedural effi-
are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Because children make poor witnesses in
intimidating court surroundings, it is extremely difficult to elicit sufficient in-court testimony to
convict a perpetrator of sexual abuse. In response to this problem, the Washington Legislature
has created a new hearsay exception. The exception admits hearsay statements about sexual
abuse, by a child under 10, on a finding by the court that the circumstances and content of the
statement indicate that it is sufficiently reliable. If the child is unavailable as a witness, the Act
requires corroboration of the criminal act as well. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp.
1982); see Comment, Confronting Child Victims of Sex Abuse: The Unconstitutionality of the
Sexual Abuse Hearsay Exception, 7 U. OF PUGET SOUND L. REV. 387 (1984); Comment,
Sexual Abuse of Children - Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813
(1983).
147. Commentators have asserted that application of the discovery rule to cases of latent
disease and asbestos was especially appropriate. Evidentiary problems are not as likely to arise
in these cases because asbestos fiber, dust particles, and foreign objects remain in the body and
can be clinically substantiated. Recent Cases, Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 239 (1983). The implication, therefore, is that where objectively verifiable physi-
cal evidence of the damage remains, it is appropriate to extend the delayed discovery rule.
Conversely, this implies that where objective physical evidence of the damage (such as silicone
particles in the tissue of the lungs) does not remain, the delayed discovery should not be
applied.
In asbestos and silicone cases, the physical irritants which cause the damage remain pre-
served as evidence in the body. Incest cases, on the other hand, manifest psychological dam-
ages. Unlike asbestos injuries, psychological damages are subjective in nature. Causal evidence
of psychological damage remains preserved primarily in the memory of the victim.
The court's unwillingness to discriminate at the pleading stage between psychological and
physical harm was made apparent in Molien:
"In our view, the attempted distinction between physical and psychological
injury merely clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether
the plaintiff has suffered a serious or compensable injury should not turn on
[an) artificial and often arbitrary classification ... To repeat: this is a matter of
proof. Screening of claims on this basis at the pleading stage is a usurpation of
the jury's function."
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 930, 616 P.2d 813, 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831,
839 (1980).
Such an "artificial classification" arises when asbestos cases go forward because the parti-
cles are preserved in lungs, while incest cases are barred because the "particles" of evidence
are preserved in the survivor's memory. This classification becomes yet more arbitrary in light
of intensive research which is making the symptoms of incest survivors objectively verifiable.
Although the issue in Molien was not the statute of limitations, the case clearly expresses
that the court should not, on the basis of a distinction between physical and emotional dam-
ages, prevent a case from reaching the trier of fact. Proof remains the central issue, not
whether the available evidence is physical in nature as opposed to psychological.
148. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 597 (Deering 1983).
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ciency over substantive justice."' 4  The fact that the court may be
forced to review stale evidence is not a dispositive concern. In incest
cases, the only alternative to a decision based on imperfect informa-
tion is to reject the unheard cause of action for violation of society's
greatest taboo.1 50
The third historical reason supporting the strict application of
the statute of limitations, is that it discourages plaintiffs from sleep-
ing on their rights.""' Applying the delayed discovery rule to adult
incest survivors arguably could erode the plaintiff's incentive to bring
suit in a timely fashion. The answer to this argument is obvious.
When the emotional and psychological injury of incest is "undiscov-
ered" by the adult plaintiff, a date-of-injury rule provides no incen-
tive for timely filing. If the date-of-injury commencement bars the
relief of blameless victims who are as yet unaware of the deleterious
effects of past incest, their guarantee of justice is violated. "For every
wrong, there is a remedy."' 3 Extending the discovery exception to
incest will guarantee the truth of this maxim.
VI. CALIFORNIA'S BALANCING TEST
Obviously, courts must be concerned with equitable decisions
for both plaintiffs and defendants. A survey of California case law
reveals several factors which the courts have considered to decide
when to fairly extend the discovery rule. Taken together, these fac-
tors form a useful balancing test which reflects the interests of plain-
tiffs and defendants in deciding the discovery rule issue. A collective
analysis of these factors may provide a court with a fair assessment
of whether, in a particular incest case, the delayed discovery rule
should apply. The California balancing factors are as follows:1 58
1) Whether timely notice was given to the defendant when the
149. Exceptions Swallow the Rule, supra note 32, at 118.
150. One commentor stated:
The issue boils down to a question of balancing. Is the policy basis . . . [of]
avoidance of stale evidence more important than the opportunity for a reasona-
bly diligent plaintiff to seek redress for his injury at all? Both are concerns of
justice. But on any scale, the barrier to-any hearing at all seems a more drastic
imposition on justice than potential harm to the quality of the fact finding pro-
cess once in court.
Id. at 119.
151. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
152. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3523 (Deering 1984).
153. Newlander v. Newlander, Civ. No. C 319 815 (Los Angeles Ciy. Super. Ct. May
26, 1983) (quoting Brief for Plaintiff, at 22).
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injury was discovered,1" '
2) Whether the defendant will suffer prejudice in his right to
gather evidence if discovery accrual is allowed, 1"
3) Whether the plaintiff acted reasonably or in good faith in
making her discovery," 6'
4) Whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the
parties,1
5 7
5) Whether the plaintiffs used reasonable diligence in seeking
professional advice upon the discovery of an injury, and'"
6) Whether there was a rational basis for the delay in
discovery."
It is difficult to discuss the balancing factors in general without ap-
plying them to a particular set of facts.1 06 However, when consider-
154. Cf Bedolla v. Logan and Frazier, 52 Cal. App. 3d 118, 129, 125 Cal. Rptr. 59, 67
(1975).
155. Cf Electronic Equip. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 834, 847-48
n.3, 176 Cal. Rptr. 239, 247 n.3 (1981).
156. Cf id. at 855, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52; Bedolla v. Logan and Frazier, 52 Cal.
App. 3d at 132, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
The first three balancing factors when taken alone constitute the equitable tolling doc-
trine whereby a plaintiff's own acts may be deemed sufficient to toll the running of the statute
of limitations against the plaintiff. Electronic Equip. v. Donald H. Seiler & Co., 122 Cal.
App. at 847-48 n.3, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 247 n.3. Applications of this doctrine have been made to
toll the statute of limitations when, for example, the filing of a workman's compensation claim
tolled the limitations statute on a plaintiff's personal injury claim, Elkins v. Derby, 12 Cal.3d
410, 115 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1974), or when the statute was tolled when a complaint was timely
filled in another state. Schneider v. Schimmels, 256 Cal. App. 2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1967).
157. Cf United States Liab. Ins. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., I Cal. 3d 586, 595-98, 463
P.2d 770, 775-77, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423-25 (1970); Hobart v. Hobart Estates, 26 Cal. 2d
412, 439-42, 159 P.2d 958, 973-75 (1945).
158. Cf Velasquez v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 97 Cal. App. 3d 881, 888-89,
159 Cal. Rptr. 113, 117-18 (1979) (asbestosis now controlled by statute).
159. Cf Bennet v. Hibernia Bank, 47 Cal. 2d 540, 563, 305 P.2d 20, 35 (1956).
160. In Newlander v. Newlander, Civ. No. C319 815, (Los Angeles Cty. Super. Ct.
May 26, 1983) (quoting Brief for Plaintiff, at 25-26) the facts of the individal case were
argued using the California balancing factors as follows:
Weighing all of the above stated factors the equity balances in favor of the
plaintiff. Here, there is no prejudice to the defendant in gathering the evidence;
the attached deposition demonstrates the contemporaneous mens rea of the
defendant.
The plaintiff filed this complaint expeditiously once she had knowledge of
her injuries; there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff; there is
a fiduciary duty established between father and daughter by both statute and
case law in California; subsequent to the initial manifestations of injury which
were brought about by plaintiff's abortion she sought professional advice in a
timely manner; moreover, the existence of the "conspiracy of silence," enhanced
by her father, more than accounts for any delay.
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ing the second factor of whether the defendant would suffer
prejudice in his right to gather evidence, it should be pointed out that
prejudice is defined as "a leaning toward one side of a cause for
some reason other than a conviction of its justice."''
Any incest case admitted under the discovery exception would
necessarily be one in which the plaintiff brought suit within one year
of discovery of her injury. The discovery rule is based on the obvious
premise that the plaintiff is unaware of her injury until she discovers
it. Her unawareness would provide no opportunity for the gathering
of prejudicial evidence. Thus, the defendant, because of the nature of
"discovery" in an incest case, would be no more prejudiced in his
attempts to gather evidence than would the victim. Furthermore, un-
like a manufacturer who does not know that an injury has occurred,
an incest perpetrator is completely aware of the incest.
Other balancing factors weigh in favor of application of the dis-
covery rule. The existence or violation of fiduciary duty is always
present in incest cases.' 62 The involvement of professional advice is
also likely to be present, since the advice of a counselor or therapist
is commonly instrumental in the discovery of the causal connection
between the incestuous relationship and the present distress. Fur-
thermore, in incest cases, the delay in timely filing is accounted for
by the shame and "conspiracy of silence" which surround any inces-
tuous relationship. Another reason for the delay is the immaturity of
the plaintiff. Few teenagers possess adequate knowledge of their le-
gal rights, or sufficient independence from the relative's undue influ-
ence in order to bring suit before their nineteenth birthday.
These equitable balancing factors drawn from California case
law are mirrored in Lopez v. Swyer, a landmark New Jersey case.es
The issue will be whether or not a party, either plaintiff or
counterclaimant, is equitably entitled to the benefit of the dis-
covery rule. All relevant facts and circumstances should be con-
sidered. The determinative factors may include but need not be
limited to: the nature of the alleged injury, the availability of
witnesses and written evidence, the length of time that has
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (5th ed. 1979).
162. See supra notes 69-91 and accompanying text.
163. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 300 A.2d 563 (1973) (medical malpractice claim
regarding radiation therapy administered to the plaintiff).
A statute reflecting factors similar to those which New Jersey discusses has been adopted
by the province of Manitoba, MAN. REV. STAT. 1954, c 145 (1967). See Comment, Statutory
Provision for the Enlargement of Limitation Periods-Manitoba, 47 CAN. B. REV. 106, 107
(1969); ef. McLaren, The Impact of Limitation Periods on Actionability in Negligence, 7
ALBERTA L. REV. 247, 254-55, 268-70 (1969).
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elapsed since the alleged wrongdoing, whether the delay has
been to any extent deliberate or intentional, whether the delay
may be said to have peculiarly or unusually prejudiced the
defendant.'"
English delayed discovery law has recently undergone several
modifications. In 1975, the English Limitations Act was revised to
allow personal injury cases a three-year period of limitation running
from the plaintiff's knowledge," if "knowledge" is later than the date
of accrual.16 Another portion of the Act established that the action
should be allowed to proceed notwithstanding the three-year limit
"where it appears to the court equitable to do so." ''  The English
courts defined this discretionary power broadly, asserting that discre-
tion could be applied in "all cases where the three year limitation
period had expired before the issue of the writ.' ' 167 The British court
explained "Parliament has now decided that uncertain justice is
preferable to certain injustices or, in other words, that certainty can
be bought at too high a price .... "'68
English courts have been instructed in deciding whether to al-
low a case to proceed beyond the three-year limitation, to "have re-
gard to all the circumstances of the case" and to six parliamentary
guidelines"" which are quite close to those enunciated in California
164. 62 N.J. at 275-76, 300 A.2d at 567-68.
A great societal taboo exists regarding incest. In applying the New Jersey factors to in-
cest, consideration of this taboo would add weight to the "nature of the alleged injury" and
thus encourage extending of the discovery exception.




168. 12 Firman v. Ellis, (1978) 2 All E.R. 851, 865.
169. The six English guidelines are as follows:
a) The length of and reasons for the delay on the part of plaintiff;
b) the extent to which, having regard to the delay, the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff or the defendent is or is likely to be less cogent than if the action had
been brought within the time limit allowed;
c) the conduct of the defendant after the cause of action arose, including the
extent, if any, to which he reponded to requests reasonably made by the plain-
tiff for information or inspection for the purpose of ascertaining facts which
were or might be relevant to the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant;
d) the duration of any disability of the plaintiff arising after the date of accrual
of the cause of action;
e) the extent to which the plaintiff acted promptly and reasonably once he knew
whether the act or omission of the defendant, to which the injury was attributa-
ble, might be capable at that time of giving rise to an action for damages; and
f) the steps, if any, taken by the plaintiff to obtain medical, legal or other expert
advice, and the nature of any such advice he may have received.
Vickers, supra note 165, at 380-81.
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case law. The California balancing factors, as reflected in the six
English guidelines and the New Jersey factors, would generally aid
adult incest plaintiffs. However, application will have to be argued
on a case-by-case basis.'7
VII. CONCLUSION
"When the reason is the same, so should the rule be the
same."' 7  In California, exceptions to date of injury accrual have
been allowed when, as in incest cases, the misrepresentations of the
defendant conceal the wrong itself. Discovery accrual has been al-
lowed where, as in incest, the plaintiff is prevented from bringing a
cause of action by the defendant's exertion of power over her. When,
as in incest cases, a confidential relationship exists between the two
parties, discovery exceptions have also been made. California has
further allowed exceptions to date-of-injury accrual when a plaintiff
has relied upon the superior knowledge of the defendant for her
well-being, and when the nature of the wrong suffered by the plain-
tiff was inherently unknowable or insidious in its nature. These rea-
English case law reflects the application of these guidelines to factual situations similar to
those of incest.
In McCafferty v. Metropolitan Police Receiver, (1977) 2 All E.R. 756, a plaintiff was
allowed to bring a cause of action against his employer for loss of hearing after the statutory
period. His reason for delay was that he wished to preserve harmonious relations with his
employer rather than become involved in litigation. Certainly the incestuous relationship and
the "conspiracy of silence" which surrounds it surpass the reasons the English court found
compelling in McCafferty.
In Buck v. English Electric, (1978) 1 All E.R. 271, the plaintiff was allowed to bring a
latent disease case 29 years after exposure, on the court's finding that evidence was sufficient
and still available. Here, the sufficiency of proof is the issue, rather than the mechanical appli-
cation of the statute of limitations. This emphasis on proof rather than deadlines is crucial to
adult incest survivors.
In Marston v. British Railways Bd. & Another, 1976 Indus. Cas. R. 124, it was asserted
that a plaintiff would be allowed to bring a cause of action beyond the limitation period when
it was shown that representation made to the plaintiff by the defendant about the injurious
activity, caused the plaintiff to delay in bringing suit. This guideline embraces the facts sur-
rounding the fraudulent aspects of incestuous relationships.
170. The more generous statutory period provided by English law suggests a practical
option for the California Legislature. California courts likely will fear extending discovery
accrual to incest survivors. The openendedness of the discovery of injury concept in the incest
context would leave defendants with little predictable repose. If the California Legislature
were to extend the statutory period for incest victims to a period of of perhaps five years from
majority, such inequity could be avoided on both sides. Fewer victims would be harshly fore-
closed from remedy before they consciously experienced the injury of their incest. In addition,
less undesirable manipulation of the discovery concept would occur. Defendants would, on the
other hand, have a period after which their slates would be wiped clean. Such proposed legis-
lation, however, is beyond the scope of this comment.
171. CAL. CIv CODE § 3511 (Deering 1984).
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sons, which California courts have acknowledged as valid ones for
extending date-of-discovery commencement of the statutory period,
are common to the plight of the adult incest survivor. That she has
been injured, is undeniable, and as research on incest victims contin-
ues, her injury may also be scientifically verifiable. The statute of
limitations is a housekeeping tool and not a substantive rule of law.
Although the statute of limitations has been used as guardian of the
courts, to prompt reticent plaintiffs to bring actions, to protect defen-
dants from inequity, and to prevent stale evidence from reaching
trial, California courts have shown a tendency to favor justice over
good judicial housekeeping. The rules of evidence are sufficiently
stringent to prevent unreliable evidence from reaching juries. Fur-
thermore, juries have long displayed the ability to weigh and balance
the evidence which does reach them. As the English courts have said,
"certainty can be bought at too high a price."''1 7
Adult survivors of incest have already paid a high price. They
have paid with their lost childhood, with their innocence and with
their bodies. To further deny them access to remedy in the courts of
law is like "the rust on the razor that threatens the throat. It is an
unnecessary insult.' 73
Denise M. DeRose
172. 12 Firman v. Ellis, (1978) 2 All E.R. 851, 865.
173. M. ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 6 (1969).
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